Somalia and the Horn of Africa are probably the best places for al-Qa'ida to gain in strength

By Patrick Cockburn

Wednesday, 4 May 2011

These days there are far more "terrorist experts" earning their living because of their supposed knowledge of al-Qa'ida than there are real members of al-Qa'ida. This is an important reason why the organisation will not fade from the headlines or from the list of threats that governments see as facing their countries despite the death of Osama bin Laden.

None of these "experts", whether they work for governments, intelligence services, the armed forces, the media or in academia, will ever have an interest in declaring al-Qa'ida or groups like it as defunct or irrelevant. Their continued employment, budgets and influence has to be justified by continuous threat inflation.

It is not that Al-Qa'ida poses no threat, but it differs markedly from public perception. The group was never a well-coordinated worldwide network of terrorists answering to a central headquarters in Afghanistan or Pakistan. But after 9/11 it had such a fearsome reputation, and occupied such a pre-eminent place in US demonology, that any hint of its presence was highly publicised and had an immediate international political impact. No government could afford to allow the US to endure another 9/11.

Obsession with al-Qa'ida leads to political tunnel vision. For example Yemen, the mountainous republic tucked away in the south-west corner of the Arabian Peninsula, has a population of 24 million mostly impoverished people, but US policy towards the Yemeni government is largely determined by the activities of an estimated 300 members of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

This handful of AQAP members do not have to do very much to cause turmoil at airports across the world. Two abortive bomb attempts organised from Yemen last year, both foiled, proved almost as successful in terms of generating disruption and fear as if the bombs had gone off as planned, as AQAP itself boasted.

The way in which the presence of al-Qa'ida has political repercussions out of all proportions to its size is demonstrated above all by Afghanistan. The US military has said that there may be little more than 100 al-Qa'ida members in Afghanistan compared to a Nato estimate of 25,000 Taliban. Yet President Obama's justification for sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan to fight in an unpopular conflict was the need to combat al-Qa'ida, which the US public does care about, rather than the Taliban, which it largely does not.

If Afghanistan is not a refuge for al-Qa'ida, how about across the border in north-west Pakistan? The semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) used to be a place of refuge for al-Qa'ida and was frequently referred to as "the most dangerous place the world", but much of it is now occupied by the Pakistani army and there are continual US drone strikes searching out Taliban and al-Qa'ida leaders seeking sanctuary in its rugged terrain. There was a good reason why bin Laden preferred to live far away from here in his villa in Abbottabad just north of Islamabad.

Many of the remaining al-Qa'ida havens are a series of franchises and several of these are absorbed in local disputes. In Iraq, al-Qa'ida became powerful for several years after 2003 as the Sunni community fought the US occupation and the Shia- and Kurdish-dominated Iraqi government. It drew strength from these struggles, but grossly overplayed its hand by trying to dominate the Sunni and wage war against the majority Shia. These days it seldom attacks US troops, though it continues to wage bloody sectarian warfare against the Shia.

In the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa'ida retreated from Saudi Arabia to set up AQAP in Yemen in 2009. Its best-known member here is Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen speaking fluent English who is one of the few al-Qa'ida leaders who can articulate the group's ideology in convincing terms. He was also linked to the shooting of 13 people by a US army major in Fort Hood in Texas. The street protests in Yemen may make it easy for al-Qa'ida to move around, but also means that opponents of the political status quo now have alternative means of opposing it.

Somalia and the Horn of Africa are probably the best places for al-Qa'ida to gain in strength. Since last year it is allied to al-Shabaab, the Somali group that controls much of the south of the country. It says it was behind suicide attacks in Uganda last year that killed 76 people. From the point of view of a secret movement planning to attack US targets, Somalia – much of which of which has descended into anarchy – has the advantage that militants can cross its land borders without being checked.

Further west, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb – many of its fighters survivors of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s – has a shadowy existence in the Sahara, kidnapping tourists and making occasional forays into the cities. It may have been behind a bomb that killed 16 people in Marrakech last week, but as a movement it does not seem to be going anywhere.

Source: The Independent

Yemen-based jihadist has potential to fill role

By James Blitz in London and FT reporter in Sana’a

May 3 2011

As western intelligence agencies try to predict the most likely author of an attack to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, a jihadist cleric in Yemen can be expected to spring to mind.

Since the September 11 2001 attacks on the US, bin Laden has been associated most in the public mind with al-Qaeda and global jihad. But the US-born Mr Awlaki, 40, has been the brains behind some of the most high-profile terror plots of recent years.

Mr Awlaki, a leading figure in the group known as al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula , was the mastermind behind the attempted bombing of an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas day in 2009. He also organised the dispatch of parcel bombs concealed in cargo aircraft bound from Yemen to Chicago in October 2010.

Airline bombs are not his only stock in trade, however. He has become a highly effective internet preacher, grooming people in western states to carry out attacks.

Mr Awlaki’s online sermons radicalised a woman who attempted to murder Stephen Timms, a former British cabinet minister, in a knife attack in May 2010. Earlier this year, he emerged as the figure who had inspired a former British Airways employee to blow up an aircraft in an attack intended to kill hundreds of people.

“Mr Awlaki is certainly the figure you now have to watch,” says a security source. “His main target is the US. But if he can cause mayhem in Britain or other western states that would be fine by him, too.”

Certainly, Mr Awlaki is not the only figure of significance inside AQAP. The leader, or emir, of AQAP is Nasser al-Wuhayshi, who was a close personal aide to bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1990s. But Mr Wuhayshi is thought by security officials to be more focused on fomenting attacks on Saudi Arabia, while Mr Awlaki has maintained a more international focus.

Intelligence chiefs point out that Mr Awlaki has two key advantages in carrying out plots against the west. First, he has access to sophisticated bomb-making equipment that can be concealed easily and is difficult for airport scanners to detect.

“You have the impression that he is in charge of a very small cell of people who are trying to be as innovative as possible,” says a security source.

Second, as the embattled government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president, draws towards its end, Yemen is a state in the throes of deep political turmoil.

President Saleh’s opponents have long argued that he has not challenged AQAP with sufficient vigour, partly because he has been battling other challenges to his rule.

Diplomats from western countries and the Gulf are also concerned that growing swathes of ungoverned territory in Yemen will give AQAP new freedom to carry out attacks. But frenetic attempts by the west to mediate a smooth transfer of power have thus far met with little success.

Security conditions are confusing and dangerous in the restive south of the country, where independent Islamist groups, secessionists and armed tribes live alongside tiny AQAP cells.

The death of bin Laden is unlikely to create much sadness among AQAP’s followers. “There is little in the way of direct communication between the organisation in Yemen and the one in Pakistan,” says Dr Murad al-Azzany, who studies Islamist groups at Sana’a University. “[Bin Laden’s] personality didn’t motivate them to carry out their activities.”

However, bin Laden’s death will still be a positive development for AQAP. The absence of an overall al-Qaeda leader might increase the importance of the organisation’s Yemeni wing by opening space for AQAP to exert further influence over the global movement – especially if that influence comes in the form of authorising a big attack.

Source: The Financial Times

Yemen women rally in support of to President Saleh

SANAA, May 3 (Xinhua) -- Hundreds of Yemeni women rallied in southern provinces of Shabwa and Ibb in support of the constitutional legitimacy of President Ali Abdullah Saleh on Tuesday, state Saba news agency reported.

The women in both provinces held banners and chanted slogans demanding Saleh to not accept any pressures by the opposition coalition that seek to topple the constitutional legitimacy, Saba said.

The demonstrators visited some military and security barracks to distribute gifts and cake to the soldiers and thanked them for maintaining the security, stability and unity of the country.

Rocked by nationwide anti-government protests which demand an immediate end to the 33-year rule of Saleh, Yemen's security and stability have also been undermined by Shiite rebellion in the north and resurgent al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in eastern and southern provinces.

Slip Sliding Into Civil War

May 3, 2011: The death of Osama bin Laden yesterday in Pakistan put the spotlight on two things. One, al Qaeda no longer depends on Pakistan as its main base. This is largely because Pakistan has become so hostile to the Arab dominated al Qaeda. Instead, the Yemen branch, AQIA (Al Qaeda in Arabia), has become the al Qaeda home office. Months of unrest, as opponents try to overthrow longtime Yemeni leader Saleh, are thought to strengthen AQIA, but that is only temporary. If a new Yemen government does not increase the pressure on AQIA, Saudi Arabia stands ready to go in and destroy an organization that loudly proclaims its goal of overthrowing the Saudi monarchy. But Yemenis have contempt for Saudi military power, an attitude based on thousands of years of history. However, in the last half century, Saudi oil has changed this ancient balance of power. Yemen is no longer more populous than the rest of Arabia, as it had been since the end of the last ice age (12,000 years ago), which gradually turned most of Arabia (except Yemen) into uninhabitable desert. Yemen, with little oil, has become an over-populated, poverty-stricken political mess. Yemeni military power is still formidable, but split among dozens of tribal and political factions. Saudi Arabia does not want to invade Yemen, but if faced with a stronger AQIA, launching more attacks into Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have shown a willingness to do whatever it takes to defend themselves.

AQIA, and the rest of al Qaeda, is finding that the death Osama bin Laden was not a big deal in the Arab world. That's because the wave of uprisings against Arab despots this year has become the focus of Arab attention. Al Qaeda has, over the last decade, become a despised organization among Arabs. The slaughter of Moslems by al Qaeda in Iraq, and other nations, destroyed most of the support al Qaeda had on September 11, 2001. Worse, the current Arab uprisings are calling for democracy more than religious dictatorship. Nevertheless, the pervasive corruption in Arab nations has kept the use of Sharia (Islamic) law a popular approach to cleaning up government. Historical, and recent, experience has shown that Sharia does not work, and simply provides more opportunities for corrupt clerics. So Sharia may not last long when applied in practice. Meanwhile, iIn Yemen, and other Arab countries, al Qaeda is seen as a failed idea that has come and gone.

President Saleh's Republican Guard is gradually being withdrawn from towns and cities in the south, and being brought back to the capital, to insure Saleh's safety. The security forces contain 150,000 men. There are 80,000 troops in the armed forces, plus 70,000 in paramilitary forces (50,000 police and 20,000 in tribal militias that are on the payroll, an effort to keep them loyal.) Over half of the government budget goes to maintaining these 150,000 armed men. Most are currently neutral, or loyal to Saleh. The president has about 20,000 armed men (half Republican Guard, half secret police) he can really depend on. Most of the others are less dependable, but only a minority of them are actively opposed to him. So far, about 150 protestors have been killed in three months of demonstrations against president Saleh. There have been fewer deaths among the security forces, tribal rebels and Islamic radicals (mostly al Qaeda).

Civil war in Yemen is now more of a possibility. Opposition groups are reluctant to negotiate with Saleh anymore, even with Saudi Arabia and the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) providing mediators (and pressure on Saleh to make a deal.)

May 2, 2011: Soldiers killed one demonstrator in the south, as protests continued.

May 1, 2011: Demonstrations began to grow again because president Saleh refused to sign the agreement that would remove him from power. In southern Abyan province, Al Qaeda gunmen attacked a government building, killing three soldiers before being driven away.

April 30, 2011: President Saleh refused to sign the transfer of power document he had earlier said he would sign. Opposition leaders see this as another effort by Saleh to wait out the demonstrations and remain in power. The violence today left two soldiers and four civilians dead, and over twenty people wounded in the port city of Aden.

April 29, 2011: Several hundred thousand people demonstrated throughout the country, mainly in the capital. There, many of the people in the streets were supporting president Saleh.

In the port city of Aden, police killed an al Qaeda leader and disrupted a bombing operation. Elsewhere in the south, an al Qaeda attack on a checkpoint left two soldiers and a civilian dead.

April 28, 2011: Nation-wide demonstrations continued, in part to protest the previous day's violence by the security forces.

April 27, 2011: In the capital, twelve protestors were killed (and over 200 wounded) by security forces, who were trying to disperse the large demonstrations. In southern Abyan province, Al Qaeda gunmen attacked troops, killing two soldiers before being driven away.

April 25, 2011: President Saleh and the opposition made a peace deal, brokered by the GCC. Once signed (on the 30th), Saleh would leave the presidency within 30 days, and new elections would be held 60 days after that.

Source: Strategy Page

Tribesmen Released Saudi Diplomat

By Fatik Al-Rodaini
Sana'a, May 3, 2011- Said Al-Maliki, a Saudi diplomat was released on Tuesday after being kidnapped by Yemeni Tribesmen in Sana'a for ten days.
The release was through tribal mediation that required the resolution of the conflict between a Yemeni and a Saudi over a money issue
Al-Maliki was kidnapped from outside his home in Sana'a. Tribal sources confirmed that the kidnapping of the Saudi diplomat had financial rather than political motives.
Foreigners have frequently been kidnapped in Yemen by tribes who use the tactic to pressure authorities into making concessions.

More than 200 foreigners have been kidnapped over the past 15 years, and most have later been freed unharmed.