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Killing or capturing leaders of terrorist groups increases the chances
these groups will collapse. In spite of what some politicians see as short-term
political and diplomatic costs, my findings suggest targeted killings are an
effective counterterrorism strategy in the long run.
By Bryan C. Price / July 18, 2012
The United States made killing and capturing terrorist leaders a key
focus of its counterterrorism strategy following the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. In addition to getting Osama bin Laden, President Obama’s
number one counterterrorism priority upon taking office, his administration has
netted scores of other high-profile leaders, including Al Qaeda leaders Anwar
al-Awlaki in Yemen and Abu Yahya al-Libi in Pakistan.
The latter successes are direct results of a greatly expanded drone
program. According to the New America Foundation, Mr. Obama has launched more
than six times as many drone strikes in Pakistan than his predecessor.
But does this “leadership decapitation” work? Does it enhance the
security of the states that use it?
Debate over this controversial tactic is growing and currently playing
out on the national stage, with critics of these targeted killings just as
vocal as supporters.
Critics argue that targeted killings do little to prevent future
attacks. Some claim that they may increase recruitment, harden terrorists’
resolve, and trigger retaliatory attacks. Still others highlight the moral and
ethical concerns of collateral damage and killing terrorist leaders without due
process, especially American citizens such as al-Awlaki. The Obama
administration has also recently come under fire after details of its approval
process for drone strikes leaked to the press. Some have argued the process is
too informal and lacking in oversight.
Conversely, supporters claim that targeting killings reduce the
terrorist group’s operational capability by eliminating its most highly skilled
members and forcing the group to divert time and resources to protect its
leaders. They allege removing leadership causes intra-organizational turmoil
and deters others from assuming power. While there are no silver bullets in
counterterrorism tactics, killing or capturing leaders can, in some cases, even
trigger organizational collapse.
New evidence suggests that killing or capturing terrorist leaders
significantly increases terrorist-group mortality rates. In other words, groups
stripped of a leader end much faster than those groups whose leaders remain
alive and in place.
The evidence is based on research from my dissertation at Stanford
University, which is described in detail in an article in the Spring 2012 issue
of International Security. To test the effectiveness of targeted killing and
capture of terrorist leaders over long periods, I used survival analysis. This
is a technique that doctors commonly use to evaluate the efficacy of medical
treatments by comparing the survival rates of patients who receive different
treatments for the same disease.
In this case, my “patients” were 208 terrorist groups that were active
from 1970 to 2008, and “leadership decapitation” was my “treatment.” The
findings were robust and consistent. Killing or capturing leaders of terrorist
organizations significantly shortened the life span of these groups.
This holds true for groups of different sizes and ideologies, although
relative differences exist between types of groups. For example, religious
groups are 80 percent less likely to dissolve than nationalist groups based on
ideology alone. However, religious groups were almost five times as likely to
collapse as nationalist groups after losing their leadership to a targeted
killing or capture.
Moreover, the earlier in its life cycle that a terrorist group loses its
leadership, the more likely it is to collapse. Killing or capturing a terrorist
leader in the first year of a terrorist group’s existence makes the group more
than eight times as likely to crumble as a group that retains its leadership.
The detrimental effects on a group from loss of leadership diminish by 50
percent in the first 10 years, and after 20 years, killing or capturing a
leader may have no effect on the group at all.
Therefore, states that choose to employ this method of eliminating
leadership as a counterterrorism tactic should allocate their resources
accordingly, concentrating their time and money on killing and capturing
leaders of terrorist groups as early in their existence as possible.
Additionally, contrary to a widely cited claim that 90 percent of all
terrorist groups last less than one year, I found terrorist groups to be much
more durable. The mean lifespan of the groups that collapsed some time during
the period of 1970 to 2008 was approximately 14 years.
If terrorist groups last longer than previously believed, then tactics
such as killing or capturing leadership, which can increase groups’ mortality
rates, deserve special attention. Politicians may ultimately determine the
short-term costs associated with this strategy outweigh the benefits, but my
findings suggest that the long-term implications of targeted killings need to
be part of the decision-making calculus.
It has been said that terrorism will never end, but that terrorists
groups do. Getting rid of their leadership makes them end sooner – a fact that
policymakers should consider when crafting counterterrorism strategy.
Bryan C. Price, Ph.D., a major serving in the US Army, will serve as the
director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point this summer. His
article, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to
Counterterrorism,” appears in the Spring 2012 issue of International Security.
