U.S. increases planned aid to Yemen in fight against al-Qaeda

By Craig Whitlock and Julie Tate,

July 19, 2012

In the latest sign of Washington’s deepening involvement in Yemen’s battle against an al-Qaeda affiliate, the U.S. military is preparing to give more than $100 million in counterterrorism and security aid to the Arabian country this year, according to newly obtained documents.

The U.S. government suspended military assistance to Yemen more than a year ago in response to then President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s suppression of mass protests and other challenges to his 33-year-long rule.

In the aftermath of Saleh’s resignation in February and an easing of the country’s political crisis, the Obama administration notified Congress last month that it intends to resume military aid to Yemen. The aid is restricted for use by Yemen’s counterterrorism forces, which are locked in a struggle with an al-Qaeda affiliate that has also targeted the United States.

In June, the Pentagon told lawmakers that it would give $75 million worth of small arms, ammunition, vehicles, hand-launched surveillance drones and other equipment to Yemen’s Interior Ministry.

New documents obtained by The Washington Post show that the military aid will be more extensive. Earlier this month, the Pentagon notified Congress that it would give Yemen an additional $37 million for its U.S.-trained special-operations units. Included in that package are two small troop-transport aircraft, 100 night-vision devices, five small “raiding” boats for commandos as well as more small arms and ammunition.

U.S. military trainers returned to Yemen in May after a year-long absence due to the suspension of security assistance. The Pentagon has declined to specify how many trainers are currently in Yemen, but officials have said the number is about a few dozen.

U.S. intelligence officials have described al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch — known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — as the leading terrorist threat to the United States, especially in the aftermath of the May 2011 death of Osama bin Laden and the weakening of al-Qaeda’s core organization in Pakistan.

In May, the Obama administration said that the CIA and intelligence agencies from Saudi Arabia and Yemen had thwarted a plot by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to bomb a U.S.-bound airliner.

Officials described the bombing plan as an updated version of previous efforts by the al-Qaeda faction to blow up transatlantic flights, including a failed December 2009 attempt by an operative to detonate a bomb he was carrying in his in underwear.

In addition to the aid to Yemen, the Pentagon this month notified Congress that it plans to give about $84 million in counterterrorism and security assistance to several African countries to counter al-Qaeda affiliates and other militant groups.

The bulk of that amount will go to Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti as part of their international security force in war-torn Somalia, where they are fighting al-Shabab, a radical Islamist faction aligned with al-Qaeda.

Uganda will also receive $22.5 million for “logistics support” in its effort to fight the Lord’s Resistance Army, a brutal guerrilla group. About 100 U.S. Special Operations Forces were deployed to central Africa in October to help troops from Uganda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Congo combat the LRA and its messianic leader, Joseph Kony.

Mehmanparast rejects claims of Iran interference in Yemen internal affairs

Tehran, July 19, IRNA - - Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast on Thursday dismissed certain Yemeni officials' claims of Iran meddling in Yemen internal affairs and said such claims and charges are "unacceptable."

“Yemeni officials are advised to do their best to construct a developed, independent and stable Yemen and address their people’s legitimate demands and questions instead of levelling charges against others,” he said.

Mehmanparast said Iran has always been respecting Yemen territorial integrity and sovereignty and has never hesitated to help Yemenis restore peace, development and tranquility in their country.

Islamic Republic News Agency/IRNA News

Yemen: Senior policeman killed by bomb in car

AHMED AL-HAJ

Associated Press

July 19, 2012

SANAA, Yemen (AP) -- A Yemeni provincial official says a bomb hidden inside the car of a senior police official has exploded and killed him in the south of the country.

The official said that Col. Abdullah al-Maouzaei, charged with hunting down members of al-Qaida's Yemen branch, had survived three previous assassination attempts before Thursday's blast in the port city of Aden. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the press.

He blamed the attack on Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, considered the most dangerous offshoot of the terror group. It seized several cities in southern Yemen during last year's uprising. Since May, government troops have retaken many of its strongholds.

In retaliation, al-Qaida has staged bombings including assassination attempts of top security officials.

US must kill and capture terrorist leaders as soon as possible. It works.

Killing or capturing leaders of terrorist groups increases the chances these groups will collapse. In spite of what some politicians see as short-term political and diplomatic costs, my findings suggest targeted killings are an effective counterterrorism strategy in the long run.

By Bryan C. Price / July 18, 2012

The United States made killing and capturing terrorist leaders a key focus of its counterterrorism strategy following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In addition to getting Osama bin Laden, President Obama’s number one counterterrorism priority upon taking office, his administration has netted scores of other high-profile leaders, including Al Qaeda leaders Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen and Abu Yahya al-Libi in Pakistan.

The latter successes are direct results of a greatly expanded drone program. According to the New America Foundation, Mr. Obama has launched more than six times as many drone strikes in Pakistan than his predecessor.

But does this “leadership decapitation” work? Does it enhance the security of the states that use it?

Debate over this controversial tactic is growing and currently playing out on the national stage, with critics of these targeted killings just as vocal as supporters.

Critics argue that targeted killings do little to prevent future attacks. Some claim that they may increase recruitment, harden terrorists’ resolve, and trigger retaliatory attacks. Still others highlight the moral and ethical concerns of collateral damage and killing terrorist leaders without due process, especially American citizens such as al-Awlaki. The Obama administration has also recently come under fire after details of its approval process for drone strikes leaked to the press. Some have argued the process is too informal and lacking in oversight.

Conversely, supporters claim that targeting killings reduce the terrorist group’s operational capability by eliminating its most highly skilled members and forcing the group to divert time and resources to protect its leaders. They allege removing leadership causes intra-organizational turmoil and deters others from assuming power. While there are no silver bullets in counterterrorism tactics, killing or capturing leaders can, in some cases, even trigger organizational collapse.

New evidence suggests that killing or capturing terrorist leaders significantly increases terrorist-group mortality rates. In other words, groups stripped of a leader end much faster than those groups whose leaders remain alive and in place.

The evidence is based on research from my dissertation at Stanford University, which is described in detail in an article in the Spring 2012 issue of International Security. To test the effectiveness of targeted killing and capture of terrorist leaders over long periods, I used survival analysis. This is a technique that doctors commonly use to evaluate the efficacy of medical treatments by comparing the survival rates of patients who receive different treatments for the same disease.

In this case, my “patients” were 208 terrorist groups that were active from 1970 to 2008, and “leadership decapitation” was my “treatment.” The findings were robust and consistent. Killing or capturing leaders of terrorist organizations significantly shortened the life span of these groups.

This holds true for groups of different sizes and ideologies, although relative differences exist between types of groups. For example, religious groups are 80 percent less likely to dissolve than nationalist groups based on ideology alone. However, religious groups were almost five times as likely to collapse as nationalist groups after losing their leadership to a targeted killing or capture.

Moreover, the earlier in its life cycle that a terrorist group loses its leadership, the more likely it is to collapse. Killing or capturing a terrorist leader in the first year of a terrorist group’s existence makes the group more than eight times as likely to crumble as a group that retains its leadership. The detrimental effects on a group from loss of leadership diminish by 50 percent in the first 10 years, and after 20 years, killing or capturing a leader may have no effect on the group at all.

Therefore, states that choose to employ this method of eliminating leadership as a counterterrorism tactic should allocate their resources accordingly, concentrating their time and money on killing and capturing leaders of terrorist groups as early in their existence as possible.

Additionally, contrary to a widely cited claim that 90 percent of all terrorist groups last less than one year, I found terrorist groups to be much more durable. The mean lifespan of the groups that collapsed some time during the period of 1970 to 2008 was approximately 14 years.

If terrorist groups last longer than previously believed, then tactics such as killing or capturing leadership, which can increase groups’ mortality rates, deserve special attention. Politicians may ultimately determine the short-term costs associated with this strategy outweigh the benefits, but my findings suggest that the long-term implications of targeted killings need to be part of the decision-making calculus.

It has been said that terrorism will never end, but that terrorists groups do. Getting rid of their leadership makes them end sooner – a fact that policymakers should consider when crafting counterterrorism strategy.

Bryan C. Price, Ph.D., a major serving in the US Army, will serve as the director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point this summer. His article, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” appears in the Spring 2012 issue of International Security.

Iranian spy cell arrested in Yemen

July 18, 2012

The Yemeni authorities have arrested an Iranian spy cell that had been working in Yemen for seven years, the military-run 26 September Newspaper said.

The Newspaper said that the cell is run by a former leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), pointing out that it is tasked with running spy operations in Yemen and African Horn.

Foreign Minister Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi had affirmed that there are a strong relations between the Houthi group and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In remarks to a Saudi newspaper, Al-Watan, Al-Qirbi said affirmed that Tehran trains the Houthis and provides them with weapons, equipments and funds.Al-Qirbi affirmed that Iran has relations with Al-Houthi group and other Yemeni groups, pointing out that such relations pose a source of concerns to Yemenis."There are other issues that we do not want to currently speak about because we are engaged in internal dialogue and hope that these issue are resolved through dialogue" he added.

Al-Qirbi had previously accused Iran of interfering in Yemen’s affairs, stressing that any Iranian cooperation with Yemeni political sides is unacceptable. "We along with all regional states are keen to have relations with Iran, but we refuse any intervention in internal affairs” he An Emirati Newspaper, Al-Khaleej.The US Ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein frequently cautioned against Iranian intervention in Yemen, indicating that Iran seeks to spark troubles in Yemen through supporting the Saada-based Houthi group.

According to the New York Times, Iran operates to increase its political outreach and arms shipments to rebels and other political figures in Yemen as part of what American military and intelligence officials say is a widening Iranian effort to extend its influence across the greater Middle East.

Source: Yemen Post