U.S.-Yemen ties strained over fighting terrorism

Sudarsan Raghavan,Karen DeYoung, Washington Post

October 8, 2011

Sanaa, Yemen -- Ties between the United States and Yemen are being strained by a growing disagreement over how to combat the Yemen terrorist group that U.S. officials have called the most potent al Qaeda franchise.

Even as both sides claim credit for the death of U.S-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in a U.S. drone strike last Friday, they are sparring over divergent priorities. Senior Yemeni officials accuse the United States of not helping government forces fight opponents, many of whom they say are al Qaeda linked insurgents intent on attacking the West, inside Yemen.

U.S. officials, in turn, express little interest in the insurgency in Yemen and say their counterterrorism efforts are limited to what they describe as a minority of al Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate that is focused on U.S. attacks. These officials say they are determined to resist efforts by the government of embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh to enlist U.S. forces and firepower in a domestic counterinsurgency and draw the United States into Yemen's internal chaos.

The dispute underscores a fundamental dilemma facing the Obama administration. Although it depends on counterterrorism cooperation from the Saleh government to target leaders of the Yemen group al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, it is seeking Saleh's resignation as part of the pro-democracy Arab Spring.

Interviews with officials from both sides portrayed some elements of the U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism relationship as contentious, at times antagonistic, despite recent public claims by senior American officials that the ties are close. "The American aid is very limited," said Gen. Yahye Saleh, a nephew of the president, who heads Yemen's U.S.-trained counterterrorism units and its powerful Central Security Forces. "Unfortunately, the American side has been paying more attention to the political situation than fighting terrorism."

The tensions come as Yemen's 8-month-old populist revolt has turned increasingly violent, with rival military forces and tribal militias battling each other in Sanaa, the capital, and other cities.

Citizens as enemies: What would you do?

CHRISTOPER HITCHENS October 8, 2011

Probably because it mainly provides the kind of short-term cinematic satisfaction that characterizes the Hellfire terminus, the flashy ending of al-Qaida’s main media star, Anwar al-Awlaki, has only led to the reopening of some pressing questions about the nature of the jihadi menace.

To phrase the essence of the problem shortly, you are perhaps more likely to be blown up at work or play by a “homegrown” or “lone wolf” fanatic than you are to die at the hands of al-Qaida or al-Shabab or any of their shifting surrogates. In the same way, it is at least as likely that a local operative will emerge from the American suburbs to commit one random and unpredictable act as it is that a fanatic will leave our shores and take himself to Somalia or Yemen or Afghanistan. And so we have the figures of Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, unsheathing his weapon at Fort Hood to yell “God Is Great!”or Faisal Shahzad, rigging his SUV to explode in Times Square.

It doesn’t seem strictly accurate to use the “lone wolf” designation in all these cases, because a potent influence on the loner can be a homegrown counselor or adviser, who speaks the vernacular and has also lived in “the belly of the beast.”

In the recent past, al-Awlaki has been the classic and most successful instance. His evolving contact with Hasan, for example, seemingly walking him through all of the stages that led up to the granting of religious permission to shoot at will, was quite systematic. There were times when al-Awlaki was working under our very noses, propagandizing in Virginia and elsewhere from the context of an existing mosque.

But he had not, at that stage, fully pupated himself into a committed Salafi jihadist. So now we have the phenomenon of an American citizen, able to whisper directly into the ears of people living here, but until recently being able to do so from a geographical location where our laws cannot reach him. There is no precedent, however remote, for a legal and moral challenge of this kind, let alone for a political or military one.

Since this dilemma will be with us for some time, may I recommend a recent booklet which offers the most background to the emergence of this fascinating and frustrating enemy? Called “As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad,” it is published by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. (Its author, I should proudly make haste to add, is my son.) The booklet explores the tradition of English-speaking Salafi agitators working in the West. But I find myself more absorbed by the aspect represented by the late Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American who until he died in the same Hellfire attack was the editor of al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula’s magazine, Inspire. Some will remember this unique online publication for its jeering, upbeat reports on the extreme cheapness of the printer-cartridge bombs that were loaded from Yemen onto planes bound for our shores . While other martyrdom tactics were being used on faraway battlefields, Khan said not long ago, and even while Osama bin Laden was being removed from the chessboard, the idea of homegrown attacks on U.S. soil was moving “into fifth gear.”

In a rhetorical way, this mirrors bin Laden’s obsessive distinction between operations against India, say, or Iraq, and spectacular assaults on “the far enemy,” or the prestige and security of the United States. But it also raises a much less grand image: that of the pathetic amateur and misfit who can commit perhaps one limited act of vicious spite against his neighbors or co-workers or even passersby.

I think it is important to watch for symptoms of sheer degeneracy like this — pick-nose wannabe murderers lurking in their parents’ basements — because there is evidence that such things (like the use of small children to carry suicide bombs) arouse revulsion even among those who otherwise wish us ill. It also dramatically reduces the caliber of recruit. On the other hand, and too little remarked, such tactics do something that is worth the price of a good deal of high explosive. They annihilate trust and confidence. Do you really want, next to you at boot camp, a man who prostrates himself five times a day? Should one say anything about the man with the beard in the next seat?

Slow and sidelong cultural erosions of this kind can do incalculable harm. And they can also be horribly and cheaply self-replicating: Some people will “overreact” to a specter of Islamism however slight, and this will offend the man who is only trying to meet his prayer obligations, and then a whole machinery of supposed grievance and redress clanks into action. Meanwhile, those who orchestrate this little carnival of mayhem and social corrosion are able to do so from areas that are beyond our legal jurisdiction but within our military reach, and to taunt us while doing so.

As we engage with the horrible idea that our government claims the right to add its own citizens to a death list that is compiled by methods and standards unknown, we must concede that no government on Earth faces such a temptation to invoke what I suppose we could call a doctrine of preemptive self-defense. Those who share my alarm at the prospect of this, and of the ways in which it could be abused, are under a heavy obligation to say what they would do instead.

New York Times Syndicate

Commentary: Yemen's field of scarecrows

October 8, 2011

Anwar Al-Awlaki's death will only bring more misery to Yemenis, writes James Gundun in Washington

He was everything that Osama bin Laden envisioned. A US-born Muslim with roots in Yemen, home to an American puppet and Saudi hegemony, Anwar Al-Awlaki would increasingly challenge America's might on his path to joining Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The charismatic cleric became a jihadist bridge to the West, from Internet sermons to video and AQAP's colourful Inspire magazine, branding Al-Awlaki as a primary threat to the US homeland. He would ultimately pursue Bin Laden's strategic goal of luring the US military into a hostile environment, in order to deprave it economically and morally.

The first objective was partially successful; given how little US policy has accomplished in Yemen, Al-Awlaki's death is worth hundreds of millions in military and economic assistance. A ground force was unnecessary and Washington had already run low on resources when AQAP became an active priority in 2009, aborting the trillion dollar campaign of Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, Yemen became the central testing ground for whether cheaper, "off-shore" counterterrorism (aerial operations, US Special Forces and CIA intelligence) can stand alone. A modest budget was inherently built into Yemen's widening front.

However, Al-Awlaki did help fulfil Bin Laden's objective of alienating a Muslim populace from America. Yemen's revolutionaries are no terrorists and don't despise America because of her freedom -- but because the US government is standing in the way of their own.

Friday was the first time that Obama mentioned Yemen in months (not counting a few passing remarks at the UN's General Assembly), and he made sure to keep quiet about its nine-month revolution against Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime. Instead, Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and lower level officials focussed on Al-Awlaki's role as AQAP's "leader of external operations", a questionable claim, and the success of joint operations with the Yemeni government, another question mark. A valid debate over civil liberties was amplified to downplay whether supporting Saleh's regime is legal; his US-trained counterterrorism units, the Republican Guard and Central Security Organisation, are currently killing protesters with impunity. This public strategy has been applied before and after Yemen's revolution began in January, inhibiting genuine regime change.

The end of AQAP starts with the end of Saleh's government, not any Al-Qaeda leader, commander, cleric or foot soldier. Progress in US counterterrorism efforts contradicts separate claims that the group has expanded its ranks and increased its threat during the same period. Saleh also stands accused of funding proxy "jihadists" and allowing AQAP room to grow, all to dupe the West into military and economic funding that he then misappropriates. The strongman functions as an ideal recruiting magnet for AQAP, a deeply unpopular American stooge who oppresses Muslims for personal gain.

Yemen's National Council of the Peaceful Revolutionary Forces (NCPRF) recently warned, "the incapable and failed regime of Sanaa is surviving only on the claim that they are countering the threat of terrorism in the region."

The Obama administration has yet to publicly accept this realisation, pushing forward with its quest to arrange a "peacefully and orderly transition" to a friendly "unity" council. Despite Saleh's political resistance and violent outbursts, the White House maintains its vigorous support of the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) generous "30/60" initiative. Orchestrated between Saleh's regime, Yemen's unpopular political opposition, US and Saudi officials, the deal offers Saleh and his family immunity for their crimes, allocates additional time to resign and schedules a presidential election too soon for Yemen's protesters to organise. The GCC's proposal was also repeatedly amended by Saleh's ruling General People's Congress (GPC) and UN officials, to the point that no one is clear on its terms.

Yemen's revolutionaries widely reject the initiative as a false exit, one that Saleh himself refuses to take it. He prefers to remain in power until an election is held at an indefinite point in the future.

US officials only attempted to cut their way through Yemen's political jungle when confronted. Amid praise for the government's cooperation and a defence of extrajudicial killings, Carney argued that Al-Awlaki's death is, "separate from President Saleh and our view about him; that has not changed. We continue to call on him to abide by the commitments he's made to begin the transfer of power immediately, as stipulated in the GCC agreement. And that hasn't changed."

Victoria Nuland, the State Department's spokeswoman, issued a similar logic that journalists found difficult to follow. The administration has left Yemen to press secretaries and counterterrorism officials, draining the life out of US diplomacy, and Nuland has been tasked for many of the administration's recent statements. Locked into a typed response, the spokeswoman retraced a GCC "roadmap" that has been bombarded by Saleh's duplicity. As Al-Awlaki's death followed fresh claims that he's the only reliable ally against AQAP -- a primal excuse to remain in power -- one reporter remarked that Saleh "states very clearly that he's not going anywhere... So how do you react to that?"

Nuland replied, "the first step in our reading of the GCC proposal is that he sign it, that he -- and in signing it, that he make clear that he will relinquish power. Then it speaks of a process of agreeing on a roadmap in which there would be new elections, which presumably would bring a fresh set of folks into power."

GCC rhetoric, of course, is how US officials must respond. What else can they say after six months of unflinching support -- that Saleh no longer needs to sign? The initiative is a stalling mechanism by design, so demanding that he agree plays into his scheme. Although US policy on Saleh was framed as a main message, Carney and Nuland spent the majority of their briefings highlighting Al-Awlaki's threat and US counterterrorism operations. The administration's political message is easily drowned out in Al-Awlaki's blur, hyped to the point that many Americans only hear that he's a terrorist, and that counterterrorism operations must continue.

In a few days Al-Awlaki will disappear from US headlines and consciousness, and all that will remain is tacit support for Saleh's regime.

Al-Awlaki was never popular or relevant amongst Yemen's revolutionaries, but his blood has now splattered their cause. Having stuck with Saleh throughout his own "off-shore" rampage to locate the cleric, the administration sacrificed hundreds of Yemenis as they continued to march for freedom. US air-strikes have also killed an undetermined number of civilians hunting AQAP cells in the southern governorates. More will follow their cruel end after Al-Awlaki's raid immediately descended into political theatre, choreographed as much as chaos can be. Whether the US tracked him for three weeks, three months or two years, Saleh was aware that a strike would occur soon. Both US and Yemeni officials confirmed a joint-intelligence operation and CIA operators coordinated with Yemeni officials during the raid. One US intelligence official added, "Allowing us to go on the property and get fingerprint analysis was a nice gesture of cooperation by the Yemeni government."

President Obama promised during Admiral Michael Mullen's farewell ceremony, "working with Yemen and our other allies and partners, we will be determined, we will be deliberate, we will be relentless, we will be resolute in our commitment to destroy terrorist networks that aim to kill Americans."

Saleh knew that Al-Awlaki's death, contrary to losing one of his pawns, would entrench his support from Washington, and duly returned to Sanaa to reap his spoils. The cleric's termination builds on months of "increased cooperation" -- new air-strikes often followed Saleh's latest offence -- and the shadowy battle for Zinjibar, orchestrated like a video game. Yemeni forces would prematurely "reclaim" the city on the eve of 9/11, garnering mutual praise from Yemeni and US officials. Al-Awlaki's importance to AQAP was exaggerated to blunt the onslaught of civil rights activists, but he now serves as "proof" that Saleh is needed to eliminate the rest of AQAP, obstructing Yemen's revolution in the process.

US personnel still need to trace AQAP chief Nasser Abdel-Karim Al-Wuhayshi, along with bomb-maker Khaled Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Asiri (US officials tentatively claimed his death as well). AQAP will replace Al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, the editor of Inspire, offering new scarecrows for Saleh to manipulate. Of greater consequence, Al-Awlaki's bargaining chip shrinks in comparison to a "secret" CIA base located on the country's outskirts, somewhere near the Saudi border. Yemen is also of vital geopolitical importance to the US, connected to Saudi Arabia, Somalia and China's spheres of influence. Saleh himself has become a scarecrow to the West, a menacing puppet that is much weaker than he appears.

Proof that only friendly dictators will continue to enjoy their safe havens.

The writer is a political scientist and counterinsurgency analyst.

Source: ahram

Nobel winner is 'mother' of Yemen's revolution

Ahmed Al-Haj,Sarah El Deeb, Associated Press

Saturday, October 8, 2011

Sanaa, Yemen -- She is known among Yemenis as the "iron woman" and the "mother of the revolution." A conservative woman fighting for change in a conservative Muslim and tribal society, Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakkul Karman has been the face of the mass uprising against the authoritarian regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The 32-year-old Karman has been an activist for human rights in Yemen for years, but when she was arrested in January, it helped detonate protests by hundreds of thousands demanding the ouster of Saleh and the creation of a democratic government.

When the Nobel announcement was made Friday, Karman was where she has been nearly every day for the past eight months: in a protest tent in Change Square, the roundabout in central Sanaa that has been the symbolic epicenter of the revolt.

"This prize is not for Tawakkul, it is for the whole Yemeni people, for the martyrs, for the cause of standing up to (Saleh) and his gangs. Every tyrant and dictator is upset by this prize because it confronts injustice," she said from her tent. With the award, the Nobel committee gave a nod to the Arab Spring, the wave of uprisings that have swept the Middle East, forcing out the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

In Yemen, millions have been turning out for protests in the capital, Sanaa, and cities around the country since late January. Still, Saleh has determinedly refused to step down.

Karman and the other young activists who have led Yemen's uprising have created a movement that is unique in this impoverished nation on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, where tribal allegiances run deep, and much of the public is religiously conservative. Like the majority of Yemeni women, Karman once wore the niqab, the conservative Muslim garb that covers the face with a veil and hides the body in heavy robes, leaving only the eyes visible. But last year, she changed to a more moderate headscarf, covering just her hair - she said she wanted to be "face to face with my activist colleagues."

Karman had organized protests and sit-ins as early as 2007. She campaigned for greater rights for women and an end to harassment of journalists, heading Women Journalists without Chains, an organization advocating for press freedoms.

Yemen president says will leave power in coming days

SANAA | Sat Oct 8, 2011

(Reuters) - Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh said on Saturday he would leave power in the coming days, the closest the veteran leader has come to announcing he plans to step down after nine months of mass protests against his 33 year rule.

"I reject power and I will continue to reject it, and I will be leaving power in the coming days," Saleh said in a speech on state television.

Saleh has been clinging to his position while opposition and ruling party representatives cast about for a formula to see through a transition-of-power deal.

"I call on my supporters to persevere and to confront any challenge," Saleh said.

Protests against Saleh's rule have paralyzed Yemen, weakening government control over swathes of the country and fanning fears al Qaeda's regional wing may use the upheaval to expand its foothold near shipping routes through the Red Sea.

Saleh has thrice backed out of signing a Gulf-mediated power transition deal. The opposition says the government is holding up negotiations after Saleh's return from Saudi Arabia, where he had gone for treatment after a June assassination attempt.